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A B S T R A C T
Biodiversity is decreasing at an alarming rate. Current policies focus on the most valuable species and habitats
but cannot stop the degradation occurring in less valuable habitats. One solution is offsetting the loss of bio-
diversity caused by development projects. The basic idea of biodiversity offsetting is simple: a developer must
provide an improvement in biodiversity so that the lost ecological value is compensated for. A banking me-
chanism for offsetting entails a third party providing offsets for developers to purchase, and thus, an offset
market emerges. We develop an equilibrium model to analyse the offset markets and apply the model to the
Finnish economy and three selected boreal habitats. We examine how the market depends on trading ratios, the
presence of an intermediary and the realization of risks associated with uncertainty. An intermediary can fa-
cilitate the market participants meeting each other with minimal transaction costs and safeguard against risks.
The results show that the size of the offset markets could potentially be quite considerable and providing offsets
could be a profitable business for landowners in Finland. The outcome of the restoration investment and a
possible time delay between biodiversity losses and gains impact the trading ratios and thus, have a major
impact on the market equilibrium. An intermediary may significantly decrease the costs of compensation for
developers, provided that it can provide mature offsets when needed.
1. Introduction
Biodiversity is decreasing at an alarming rate. Increasing human
population size, land use and consumption cause ecosystem degrada-
tion and are among the greatest threats to biodiversity and ecosystem
services, as well as to the future of humanity (MEA, 2005). Biodiversity
is an essential underlying feature of well-functioning ecosystems that
provide numerous ecosystem services: clean water, food, raw materials,
nutrient recycling, pollination, climate regulation and recreation, to
mention a few. The human use of ecosystem services is growing rapidly;
approximately 60% of the ecosystem services evaluated in the Millen-
nium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) are being degraded or used un-
sustainably. For instance, half of the provisioning services and 70% of
the regulating and cultural services are being degraded (MEA, 2005).
From an economic angle, biodiversity is a public good. Public goods,
such as the public ecosystem services that biodiversity sustains, are
non-excludable from potential users and non-rival in consumption
(Kolstad, 2000). Therefore, a market economy, based on private
property and excludability, fails to price and provide them at the de-
sired level (Kolstad, 2000). As a result of this market failure, the price of
land does not provide an incentive for developers to consider biodi-
versity in their decision making. Their businesses result in a negative
externality to the environment and lead to habitat loss. Government
intervention is needed to save and maintain biodiversity. Current po-
licies focus on the most valuable species and habitats but cannot stop
the degradation occurring in less valuable habitats, due to everyday
development projects.
One way to address this problem is offsetting the loss of biodiversity
caused by development projects (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010;
OECD, 2016; Wende et al., 2018). The basic idea of biodiversity off-
setting (also called ecological compensation) is simple: a developer
must provide an improvement in degraded habitats elsewhere so that
the lost ecological value is compensated for. Usually, compensations are
required to guarantee no net loss of biodiversity – sometimes a net gain
is set as a more ambitious objective (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010).
Offsets are generated by restoring degraded habitats, creating new
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habitats and, in some cases, preserving existing valuable ecosystems
(OECD, 2016). Developers need not generate the compensations by
themselves; they can buy offsets from a third party who provides ha-
bitat restoration – often referred as habitat banking (Wissel and
Wätzold, 2010). This makes offsetting an economic instrument and
allows a market to emerge.
Biodiversity offsetting represents the last resort within a so-called
mitigation hierarchy: avoiding, minimizing, restoring and offsetting
(Bull et al., 2013; McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010; Wende et al., 2018).
Offsetting should compensate only for the residual impacts of devel-
opment projects after appropriate efforts have been made to avoid
damage to ecosystems, to minimize all the unavoidable impacts and to
restore biodiversity on-site. Damaging of particularly vulnerable eco-
systems and habitats or endangered species should be avoided at all
times (BBOP, 2012). Biodiversity offsets should be additional: only
those compensation measures that would not have otherwise occurred
can be counted as offsetting (McKenney and Kiesecker, 2010; Wende
et al., 2018).
From an economic perspective, the no-net-loss objective resembles
an emission cap in the trading schemes, because it sets a limit to the
biodiversity loss caused by development (McKenney and Kiesecker,
2010; OECD, 2016). Offsetting schemes internalize the external costs of
development projects. They establish a counterpart to a ‛pollution pays
principle’, which we call here a ‛spoiler pays principle’. Offsetting
schemes provide several incentives to conserve biodiversity (Calvet
et al., 2015a). Since offsets cause significant costs for developers, they
will ex ante reduce impacts on biodiversity. Developers minimize land
use and allocate their projects in lands with less valuable habitats. Thus,
they intensify the application of the mitigation hierarchy. Developers
will also fulfil their offsetting requirement in a cost-effective manner.
Lastly, landowners have an incentive to invest in production of offsets,
which enables large and expensive conservation projects.
Although biodiversity offsets offer the prospect of achieving further
conservation outcomes, they are not a panacea for halting biodiversity
loss (Bull et al., 2013; Maron et al., 2016). Ecological risks, as well as
the theoretical and practical challenges of offsetting, have been widely
discussed in the literature (Calvet et al., 2015b). These problems in-
clude difficulties in measuring biodiversity and matching losses and
gains (Gamarra et al., 2018; Maron et al., 2012; Quétier and Lavorel,
2011), as well as difficulties to achieve the goal of no net loss (Gardner
et al., 2013; Gibbons et al., 2018; Bull et al., 2016a). Time lags between
ecological loss and gain, uncertainties and the use of trading ratios and
multipliers have also been examined in several publications (e.g. Bull
et al., 2016b; Laitila et al., 2014; Moilanen et al., 2009).
Economic analysis of biodiversity offsetting schemes is sparse
(Calvet et al., 2015b). Most of the studies have focused on offset pro-
duction, investments and costs (Coggan et al., 2013b; Fernandez and
Karp, 1998; Drechsler and Hartig, 2011), the release of offset credits
(BenDor et al., 2014), risks (Levrel et al., 2017), landowners' and in-
termediaries' incentives (Coggan et al., 2013a; Hartig and Drechsler,
2009), as well as spatial considerations (Bonds and Pompe, 2003;
Drechsler and Wätzold, 2009). While providing understanding of many
issues impacting market outcomes, these studies have not provided
analysis at the market level; their focus was on some specific feature of
the market only. Unlike others, Doyle and Yates (2010) analytically and
empirically examined the emerging offset market. They found that to
achieve no net loss, both economic and ecological processes must be
accounted for. Market entry, the quality of restored ecosystems relative
to natural ecosystems and especially, the relationship between the
ecosystem function and size of the restoration project affect the choice
of a trading ratio. When ecological factors are considered, both excess
entry and insufficient entry may occur on the offset market.
Previous literature has shown that the design of institutional set-
tings may impact a multitude of market outcomes: equilibrium prices,
potential size of the market, transaction costs and realization of risks
associated with uncertainty (Vaissière and Levrel, 2015; van Teeffelen
et al., 2014; Wissel and Wätzold, 2010). Here, we develop an equili-
brium model to analyse the offset markets. We focus on perfect well-
functioning markets and examine the impact of trading ratios, the
presence of an intermediary and the realization of risks associated with
uncertainty. An intermediary, a broker, can facilitate the market par-
ticipants meeting each other with minimal transaction costs and safe-
guard against risks. There can be ecological differences between de-
graded and restored habitats as well as a time delay before gains
mature, which calls for the use of trading ratios. The trading is based on
the no-net-loss principle.
We apply the analytical model to the Finnish economy and three
selected boreal habitats: abundant wetlands, scarce herb-rich forests
and expensive and laborious traditional agricultural biotopes. We as-
sume that the supply of offsets comes from habitat restoration and
nature management. Data on the areas that are suitable for habitat
restoration and associated costs is obtained from many documented
sources. For demand, we employ documented predictions on the in-
crease in built-up areas and infrastructure. We use Monte Carlo simu-
lation to examine the impacts of uncertainty on the outcomes of habitat
restoration. Estimates of the risks are developed by a survey to spe-
cialists on each habitat chosen.
2. Economic Model
2.1. Biodiversity Offset Market Model
Consider a representative landowner making a habitat restoration
investment in his/her land. This landowner takes a restoration effort (x)
to improve the habitat; x is a continuous decision variable. The re-
storation effort immediately increases the state of the habitat, which
also leads to improvement over time. To formalize this idea, let an
ecological function f(s) represent the evolvement of the habitat over
time s, and let a restoration function A(x) describe the effect of re-
storation effort on the evolvement of the habitat. Thus, offset credits
from a given habitat area (q) evolve over time by = −q A x f s f s( ) ( ) ( ),
where f s( ) is the evolvement of the habitat in the business-as-usual
scenario.
The effort is costly, however. We assume that habitat restoration
entails a lump sum investment cost (F) and a unit cost related to effort
(w). Let p be the price of offsets. Assume that society has decided that
the improvement in biodiversity is determined τ years after the in-
vestment and that this improvement can be sold as compensation im-
mediately. In other words, parameter τ represents a point in time when
the improvement in the state of the habitat is measured; what the exact
number of years τ is, is naturally based on a social agreement. Now, f(τ)
represents the state of the restored habitat at point in time τ and f τ( )
represents the state of the habitat in the business-as-usual scenario
where the habitat is not restored. We assume that the landowner is risk
neutral, i.e. uses the expected values and maximizes profits (π) from
habitat restoration in a given land area,
= − − −max π p A x f τ f τ wx F j[ ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ), (1)
where j is distance and F′(j) > 0, indicating that fixed costs increase
with distance. This increase in costs arises from the fact that restoration
is more expensive in remote areas, for instance, due to higher transport
costs for machinery and equipment. Thus, we assume that moving to
remoter areas increases the costs and there is a distance that defines the
last land parcel restored.
The choice of effort is implicitly determined by
= ′ − =π pA x f τ w( ) ( ) 0.x (2)
Using Eq. (2), the optimal effort is chosen by equating the expected
marginal revenue from restoration with the unit cost of the effort.
Solving for the effort gives: x=[pf(τ)−w]/A′(x)−1, where −1 marks
the inverse function. Thus, the choice of effort positively depends on the
price of offsets and negatively on the unit price of effort. Eq. (2) holds
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for any land parcel. How many parcels does the landowner restore? Let
πA denote the return to land in an alternative use. The distance that
defines the last land parcel restored is defined by: j∗ : π(x∗)= πA. We
use this distance to close the model. This condition, together with Eq.
(2), defines the supply of offsets (qs) as a function of offset prices and
costs: ∫= −∗
∗
q A x p w f τ f τ dj[ ( ( , )) ( ) ( )]s
j
0
. Offset supply is an increasing
function of offset price,















We turn next to the need for offsets. A representative developer
developing an area for utilization (such as a mine or a production fa-
cility) causes biodiversity loss and needs to buy offsets for compensa-
tion. How much the developer is willing to pay is dependent on the
profitability of the project and the extent of the loss. Thus, the devel-
oper obtains utility, i.e. profits, from offsetting as it facilitates the
profitable business. Following Doyle and Yates (2010), but using profits











where a and b are positive constants, qd is the ecological loss in the
habitats requiring offsetting and p is the price of offset credits. Choosing
qd yields a− bqd− p=0. The marginal profits derived from offsets
equal the offset price. This condition results in the demand function
qd=(a− p)/b, which is downward-sloping in offset price: qpd=− 1/
b < 0.
The market equilibrium can now be defined, based on the choices of
the representative supplier and demander. We still need to impose the
trading ratio, denoted by σ. The trading ratio is calculated between the
degraded and restored habitats to set the ecological value of losses and
gains equal by adjusting the required amount of restored land. If the
ecological value of losses and gains are identical, the trading ratio is
equal to 1, and the area of restored habitat is equal to the degraded land
area. If the gain is higher than the loss, the trading ratio could be<1.
When the loss is higher than the gain, the ratio should be>1. In the
former case, the restored land area is smaller than degraded land area,
and in the latter case it is the other way around. If there is a time delay
before generated gains mature, a higher trading ratio is needed. We
consider this possibility in the numerical analysis. In the market equi-
librium, demand for offsets is dependent on the required trading ratio,
so that the equilibrium price is defined where demand meets supply:
=∗p q σ q: ( ) .d s (5)
The trading ratio is calculated case-by-case to adjust for the ecolo-
gical differences between losses and gains: each development project
causes different amount of degradation and each restoration project
provides different amount of ecological gains. From Eq. (5), we see that
the trading ratios affect the aggregate demand. To illustrate this, con-
sider Fig. 1, where the downward-sloping demand function and the
upward-sloping supply function are illustrated. The equilibrium price is
determined by their intersection and marked by p* in both panels of
Fig. 1. The total area of compensation sites traded in the market is
marked by Q*. On the market level, we take into account the different
case-by-case trading ratios. The aggregate demand is a function of
trading ratios employed in individual offsetting cases. Now, if the
trading ratios exceed unity (σ > 1), the aggregate demand curve
moves outwards (panel on the left). The developer would be willing to
buy the increased amount Q** at price p’ but must pay the new equi-
librium price p**. If the trading ratios are< 1 (σ < 1), the aggregate
demand curve moves inwards (panel on the right). The developer will
then buy a decreased amount of Q** compensation at a lower price p**.
2.2. Parametric Analysis: Scrutinizing Supply
The previous analysis was general, and in this section, we express
the model in parametric forms to facilitate the scrutiny of alternative
ecologically relevant cases of restoration. This leads to multiple cases of
the basic model. We then apply this parametric model numerically to
Finnish data.







.k τ l( )0 (6)
In Eq. (6), L sets the maximum point of the curve, i.e. the natural
state of the habitat, and k determines the slope of the curve. The sig-
moid curve provides many advantages for the analysis, as it allows
setting the central point l0, which changes the starting point of the
curve and fixes the state of the restored habitat in the beginning, since
the restoration effort immediately improves the state of the habitat. The
sigmoid curve is first increasing at an increasing rate (convex), then at a
decreasing rate (concave). It describes the evolvement of the habitat
better than a linear approximation. A sigmoid curve is frequently em-
ployed in ecology, for instance, to describe the species-area relationship
(e.g. Biedermann, 2003; Tjørve, 2003), the relationship between ha-
bitat loss and the probability of extinction (Fahrig, 2001), and the re-
lationship between habitat quality and biological condition (Barbour,
1991). It may be misleading, however, for cases in which rare species
emerge in the compensation area over time, making the curve convex,
but presumably these cases are rare.
Restoration accelerates the recovery of the degraded habitat to-
wards its natural state. We add the effect of the restoration investment
to Eq. (6), using a multiplicative formulation as follows:







+− − − −
A x f τ f τ α βx x
e e
( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) 1
1
1
1k τ l k τ l( ) ( )0 0
(7)
Parameter ∅ is added to determine how degraded the state of the
habitat is before restoration (in the numerator, L=1, to set a limit to
the evolvement to the natural state). Parameter ∅ in turn determines
the business-as-usual state of the habitat. We have a quadratic pro-
duction function (α− βx)x with decreasing marginal product to re-
present the effect of restoration. Parameters α and β are technology
parameters.
We consider three illustrative hypothetical cases, all of which are
relevant for restoration projects and offsetting markets. They illustrate
the differences between the different types of restoration costs and their
timing. Here, we provide a parametric analysis of these cases, which is
relevant for our numerical calculations in the next section. Case 1 is the
simplest: only an up-front investment is required, and no other costs
accrue after the first restoration investment. Restoring degraded wet-
lands provides an example. In case 2, we assume that the costs are
periodic: after the initial investment, regular follow-ups are required to
maintain the recovery of the habitat. This case is relevant, e.g. for herb-
rich forests. Case 3, annual costs, is exemplified with traditional rural
biotopes. They require a laborious and expensive investment, because
of yearly management. As an extension to this case, we consider a
possibility that the landowner must wait for the offset credits to mature
before selling.1
Case 1. An up-front investment.
Under the above specification, the landowner maximizes profits
from restoration investment according to Eq. (7):
1 We have also examined a case where a percentage of offset credits can be
sold in advance, and the remaining credits at a future point in time. The results
can be found in Appendix A.
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Eq. (9) provides the simplest choice of restoration effort. It is
characterized by the restoration technology parameters (the first term)
and the evolvement of the habitat weighted by the cost-price ratio (the
second term).
Comparative statics reveals that the optimal restoration effort is
dependent on the technology parameters α and β, the price and vari-


















0; 0; 0; 0.
In the restoration function, the technology parameters have oppo-
site impacts: an increase in parameter α increases the optimal effort,
and a higher β decreases the optimal effort. An increase in the offset
price leads to an increase in the optimal effort, whereas increasing costs
decrease it, which means that the choice of effort depends positively on
the price of offsets and negatively on the unit price of effort.
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The choice of effort depends positively on ∅, τ and k. Thus, the
better the initial state of the habitat, the higher the optimal effort.
When the increase in ecological value is measured at a later point in
time, the optimal effort increases. An increase in the slope of the curve
increases the optimal effort as well. Parameter l0 has a negative impact
on the optimal effort. It fixes the starting point of the curve, since the
restoration effort immediately improves the state of the habitat. Thus,
the smaller this impact, the higher the optimal effort.
The point in time when the improvement in the state of the habitat
is measured impacts credits supplied in the following manner:










f τ f τ( ) ( , ) ( , ).
Thus, if ∅f τ( , ) is decreasing, measuring the increase in ecological
value at a later point in time increases the supplied amount of credits.
However, if ∅f τ( , ) is increasing, i.e. the state of the habitat improves
also in the business-as-usual scenario in which the habitat is not re-
stored or managed, the impact of τ is ambiguous.
Case 2. Periodic costs.
In case 2, we assume that after the initial investment (F), additional
restoration is needed, which occurs at time m. Thus, the profit function
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Comparing Eq. (11) with Eq. (9) reveals how discounting impacts
the outcome. The difference lies in the discounting factors (1+ r)−m
multiplying the term w/B. It means that the further in time the future
costs of effort occur (higher m), the higher the restoration effort.
Qualitatively, comparative statics remains the same. The impact of the








Case 3. Costs accrue annually.
Suppose, that there is a habitat that needs continuous management
and thus, restoration costs occur every year. We use annuity to discount


















− − − −
−









1 (1 ) ( ).
k τ l k τ l
m
( ) ( )0 0
(12)
The optimal effort is now defined by
Fig. 1. Impact of a trading ratio on the price of offset credits (p) and the total area of the compensation sites (Q).
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Further, we examine an option where the revenue the landowner
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The optimal effort in this case is defined by
















Again, the difference in comparison with the benchmark Eq. (9) is
defined by the term [1− (1+ r)−m]/r(1+ r)−n. Irrespective of the
sizes of n and m, [1− (1+ r)−m]/r(1+ r)−n > (1+ r)−m/1. Thus,
relative to the previous case, the latter negative term increases, and
when costs occur annually, the optimal effort decreases. In this case, the
effect of the discount rate is ambiguous. Otherwise, comparative statics
remains the same.
Our formal analysis of investments in producing offsets and the
market is now complete. We next apply the model to empirical cases.
3. Data
3.1. Habitats and Restoration Measures
We apply the model to Finnish data with three habitat types: pine
mires, herb-rich forests and traditional rural biotopes. The habitats are
representative of the environment in Finland and highlight the differ-
ences in restoration costs and timing of the investment. We utilize the
results of the working group on improving the status of habitats in
Finland (Kotiaho et al., 2015) for the valuation of the ecological state of
each habitat, habitat-specific restoration and nature management
measures and the cost estimations of the investments.
The valuation of the ecological state of each habitat is based on
habitat-specific structural characteristics, which are weighted ac-
cording to their importance for biodiversity. Following the ELITE
method presented in Kotiaho et al. (2015), the ecological state can
range from 0 to 1, where 1 is equivalent to a habitat in its natural state,
or in the case of rural biotopes and herb-rich forests, the target state of
the habitat. Eq. (16) is used to calculate the state of the habitat in its
current state (Kotiaho et al., 2015):



















Here, R is the current state of the habitat, N the number of structural
characteristics and Ln the weight indicating the importance of each
characteristic to biodiversity. The weight is a percentage by which the
state of the habitat degrades if that factor is completely lost. The terms
ncur and nref are the current state and the natural state of characteristic
n.
Landowners supply biodiversity offsets for compensation by per-
forming restoration and nature management measures, thus resulting in
additional biodiversity gains that would not otherwise occur.
Restoration includes measures that initiate or accelerate the recovery of
an ecosystem towards its original natural state (Kotiaho et al., 2015).
Nature management refers to measures aimed at maintaining a habitat
in certain phases of succession that are the most crucial to biodiversity
(Similä and Junninen, 2011). There is a wide array of methods that aim
to enhance ecosystem recovery, and next we describe them in further
detail for each habitat type selected. Since it is important to ensure the
long-term existence of the offsets, we assume that compensation areas
are established as permanent conservation areas or preserved in an-
other legally binding fashion.
3.1.1. Pine Mires
As the first habitat type, we focus on the restoration of oligotrophic
pine mires. A mire is geologically defined as an area with a peat layer of
at least 30 cm, but the area covered by mires is considerably larger in
biological terms (Raunio et al., 2008). Pine mires are usually nutrient
poor, with a thick peat layer. Peatland drainage for forestry and peat
harvesting are the most important causes of threats to mire species
(Rassi et al., 2010). Construction of infrastructure and groundwater
abstraction have also deteriorated mires. Currently, only about 40% of
the original area of mires has been left undrained in Finland. Ap-
proximately half of all mire habitat types are classified as threatened.
There are 4.7million ha of pine mires in Finland, of which 2.8 mil-
lion ha are drained (Kotiaho et al., 2015). We consider a pine mire that
is drained, but peat harvesting and forestry are unprofitable, which
makes it a good area for restoration.
Hydrology is the most important factor affecting the state of mire
ecosystems. Drainage and other land use disturb the hydrology by
blocking water flow to the mire or increasing the outflow of water.
Drainage especially lowers the water level in mires and increases the
number of trees. Thus, mire species are replaced with species adapted to
dryer and shadier environments. The ecological state of pine mires is
presented in Table 1. Drawing on Eq. (16), the current state is esti-
mated, based on tree stand and hydrology. Hydrology is estimated
roughly on a percentage basis: 100% represents hydrology in the nat-
ural state and 0% a completely degraded hydrology in which natural
water flow is nonexistent. Hydrology is given more weight, due to its
high importance to the state of mire ecosystems. The current state of
pine mires is on average 0.32 (Kotiaho et al., 2015).
Restoration measures consist of filling drains and removing tree
stands to an amount consistent with a pine mire in a natural state
(Kotiaho et al., 2015). When the drains are filled, the water level is
expected to reach its natural state and the flow of water recovers. The
recovering hydrology is a precondition for the recovery of structure and
functions of a mire ecosystem. Removing trees will restore the openness
of the mire and partly affect the water levels as well.
3.1.2. Herb-rich Forests
The second habitat type we consider is herb-rich forests, which are
Finland's most lush and species-rich forest type, and usually support
several tree species (Raunio et al., 2008). In Finland, almost half of the
threatened forest species and>40% of all red-listed forest species live
primarily in herb-rich forests (Rassi et al., 2010). Various types of herb-
rich forests are also among the most threatened forest habitat types
(Raunio et al., 2008).
The amount of decaying wood is one of the most important factors
affecting the diversity of forest species (Rassi et al., 2010). Forest
management activities, changes in the tree species composition, re-
duction of old-growth forests and the decreasing numbers of large trees
are also significant threats (Raunio et al., 2008). Forestry and the lack
of natural disturbance dynamics have long reduced the variety of tree
species in forest stands. Forests are even aged, they lack the diversity of
early succession forests and old-growth forests are rare. In recent years,
the use of wood provided by forests has been intensified in Finland, e.g.
by shortening the felling cycle and collecting logging residue and
Table 1
Structural characteristics of pine mires.
Tree stand Hydrology State of the habitat
Natural state 20m3/ha 100 1.0
Weight 0.1 0.95
Current state on average 30m3/ha 30 0.32
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stumps for biofuel, which will further decrease the amount of decaying
wood remaining in forests (Rassi et al., 2010).
We refer to a target state instead of a natural state, since with
management, herb-rich forests are maintained in certain phases of
succession to prevent the natural proliferation of spruce, which nega-
tively impacts the diversity of herb-rich forest species. Three structural
characteristics that indicate the degradation of herb-rich forests are
presented in Table 2: the number of large trees (with a diameter of at
least 40 cm), the amount of decaying wood and the volume of broad-
leaved trees (Kotiaho et al., 2015). These factors are crucial to the di-
versity of forest species and forest habitats. Large trees serve as im-
portant perches for predatory birds and epiphytes. Large trees also
produce important large-sized decaying wood. Broad-leaved trees are
especially crucial to biodiversity in herb-rich forests and, thus, their
volume is given the greatest weight. Currently, the state of herb-rich
forests is on average 0.44.
Herb-rich forests are restored using nature management measures
that aim to establish forests dominated by broad-leaved trees, with a
diverse tree stand structure, decaying wood and large trees (Kotiaho
et al., 2015). Although takeover by spruce is part of the natural suc-
cession, it negatively impacts the diversity of herb-rich forest species.
Thus, the objective of nature management is not to achieve a forest in
its natural state, but to maximize biodiversity in the habitat. The nature
management measures include reducing the number of spruce and
managing the forest, regularly if needed, to prevent the natural pro-
liferation of spruce, to increase the proportion of broad-leaved trees and
to secure variation in the tree stand structure. Formation of decaying
wood can also be promoted, where appropriate.
3.1.3. Rural Biotopes
Finally, we examine traditional rural biotopes, which include var-
ious open, dry, mesic and moist grasslands resulting from grazing or
mowing, as well as wooded pastures and meadows. All traditional rural
biotopes are classified as critically endangered or endangered in
Finland (Rassi et al., 2010). Their area has declined by> 90% since the
1940s, with their quality considerably deteriorated.> 20% of red-listed
species have rural biotopes as their main habitat. The most significant
threat to rural biotope species is the overgrowth of meadows and other
open habitats. Open habitats have closed up, due to changes in farming
and pasturing practices; the number of small- or intermediate-sized
farms has declined, and in many areas traditional grazing and mowing
have either ceased or decreased considerably. Conservation of tradi-
tional rural biotopes requires continuous management. Currently,
30,000 ha are managed, while the minimum target for ensuring the
conservation of the most important species is 60,000 ha (Kemppainen
and Lehtomaa, 2009).
Again, we refer to a target state instead of a natural state, since rural
biotopes are shaped and maintained by human activities and lose the
biodiversity characteristics typical of these habitats without constant or
repeated management. The structural characteristics needed to estimate
the ecological state of rural biotopes are presented in Table 3: vegeta-
tion, the openness of the habitat and the history of soil cultivation
(Kotiaho et al., 2015). Vegetation refers to the condition of the field
layer. Overgrowth, eutrophication and poor management disturb the
plant species typical of rural biotopes. Openness of the habitat refers to
the fact that rural biotopes are typically open grasslands, pastures and
meadows with diverse field layers and few trees. The increasing
numbers of trees and shrubs reduce the typical openness of the habitat
and replace the species adapted to open ecosystems. The history of soil
cultivation affects the plant species composition in the habitat. Fertili-
zation and turning the habitat to intensive agricultural use are harmful,
because soil cultivation alters the structure of the soil and thus affects
the plant species. The habitat is in its target state when all factors are in
100% condition. The current state of rural biotopes is on average 0.06.
Thus, the state of traditional rural biotopes is weakest in comparison
with the other habitat types considered in this study.
Traditional rural biotopes require repeated management measures
to maintain the habitat conditions preferred (Kotiaho et al., 2015). If a
rural biotope has been unattended for a prolonged time, it requires a
thorough renovation that includes thinnings, removing coppices and
young trees and mowing unfavourable vegetation. Thereafter, the
biotope is managed annually to prevent overgrowth and to maintain
open areas. The repeated management measures include grazing and
mowing, which maintain the habitat characteristics preferred and en-
able the survival of the fauna and flora typical of rural biotopes. Thus,
the species composition characteristic of rural biotopes is maintained.
3.2. Uncertainties of Habitat Recovery
There is uncertainty in how different habitats respond to restoration
and management. To map the scope of these uncertainties, we designed
and conducted an expert survey. The objective was to estimate how the
habitats would develop without restoration and/or nature management
measures compared with a business-as-usual scenario, and how the
outcomes of restoration and nature management measures vary under
uncertainties. The survey was conducted for each habitat type sepa-
rately, and the respondents were experts specialized in the ecology of
the habitat in question. Ten respondents received the surveys regarding
pine mires and rural biotopes, while the survey for herb-rich forests was
sent to nine respondents. The experts represented the up-to-date un-
derstanding of these habitat types in Finland.
In the introduction of the survey, both the habitat type and the
specific restoration measures were described as mentioned in this study.
We first asked the respondents to estimate, based on their best knowl-
edge, how the habitat would develop without any restoration measures
in 100 years and in 200 years. The respondents were also asked to give
estimates for the most likely value, as well as the minimum and max-
imum values, for the possible outcomes of habitat restoration after
100 years. The respondents were also asked to estimate the prob-
abilities for each value. Finally, the respondents estimated the prob-
ability that the restored habitat would reach a natural state after
200 years. In addition, after each question, the respondents were asked
to give a confidence level for their answer on a Likert scale 1–5
(1= completely uncertain, 5= completely certain). The responses are
Table 2
Structural characteristics of herb-rich forests.
Number of large trees Amount of decaying wood Volume of broad-leaved trees State of the habitat
Target state 30m3/ha 100m3/ha 100m3/ha 1.0
Weight 0.4 0.4 0.6
Current state on average 10.1 m3/ha 7m3/ha 92m3/ha 0.44
Table 3







Target state 100% 100% 100% 1.0
Weight 0.85 0.75 0.95
Current state on
average
10% 20% 60% 0.06
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presented in Table 4 and Fig. 2 below. The averages are weighted based
on the confidence levels given. We present the questionnaire as well as
the results and a statistic summary in Appendix B.
The responses show that the state of pine mires gradually develops
towards the natural state without restoration (Table 4). Since we as-
sume here that peat harvesting and forestry are unprofitable, drainage
maintenance would stop and the hydrology would slowly start to re-
cover. However, filling the drains and removing the trees would cause
the mire to recover more rapidly towards its natural state. The state of
herb-rich forests would decrease significantly without nature manage-
ment measures, mostly due to forestry and the lack of natural dis-
turbance dynamics. Nature management measures would restore the
structural characteristics of herb-rich forests, above all by removing
spruce and leaving broad-leaved trees standing. Currently, traditional
rural biotopes are in a highly degraded state, and without management
their state would gradually fall to zero. Thinnings, removing coppices
and mowing unfavourable vegetation would restore the openness of the
habitat, and annual management would cause the habitat to recover
towards its target state. The respondents were optimistic about suc-
ceeding in restoration; their estimate for the likelihood of the habitat
reaching its natural state in 200 years is on average 92% in pine mires,
94% in herb-rich forests and 92% in rural biotopes.
We use Eq. (6) and Table 4 to illustrate the evolvement of habitats in
Fig. 2 over a 200-year time period. The upper lines represent the most
likely case under habitat restoration, based on the expert estimates,
which show that the habitats gradually approach their natural state.
The lower graphs indicate how the habitats were predicted to evolve
over time if they were not restored or managed. They illustrate the
above-described finding that the state of herb-rich forests and tradi-
tional rural biotopes would degrade over time and decline to near-zero.
Pine mires differ from herb-rich forests and traditional rural bio-
topes in that their state develops towards the natural state without
restoration if they are left intact. Thus, the improvement in the ecolo-
gical state, which would be achieved with restoration, is considerably
lower in pine mires than in the other habitats in this study. The increase
in the state of the habitat is 0.34 units (recall that the ecological value is
scaled between 0 and 1) after 100 years and 0.40 units after 200 years,
whereas in traditional rural biotopes the same figures are 0.81 and 1.0.
Since the traded offset credits are calculated by an ecological index
value representing an increase in the ecological state in a restored land
area, this suggests that there would be fewer offset credits for sale per
hectare in pine mires than in the other habitat types.
3.3. Parameters in the Simulation Model
In the previous sections, we introduced the habitat types selected for
the application of the model, measures to restore and manage them, as
well as the evolvement of the habitats with and without restoration and
Table 4
Weighted averages of survey responses.
Current state Restored, 100 years Business-as-usual
Lower bound Most likely Upper bound 100 years 200 years
Pine mires 0.32 0.63 0.79 0.89 0.45 0.6
Herb-rich forests 0.44 0.68 0.84 0.95 0.21 0.18
Rural biotopes 0.06 0.56 0.85 0.94 0.04 0.005
Fig. 2. Evolvement of the ecological state of the habitats. X-axis represents time and y-axis represents the ecological value of the habitat.
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management. Now, we represent the parameters in the model, which
are scaled in accordance with data on the evolvement of the habitats
from the expert survey, and the costs of restoration and nature man-
agement (Kotiaho et al., 2015). Recall Eq. (7) representing the evol-
vement of the habitat with restoration effort:
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Table 5 includes the parameters in the empirical application of the
restoration model. Pine mires are an example of case 1, herb-rich forests
represent case 2 and traditional rural biotopes case 3.
The technology parameters were scaled so that the effort varies
between 0 and 1 and full effort would cause the habitat to evolve op-
timally towards its natural or target state. The degraded state of the
habitat was scaled so that it corresponds to the data represented in
Tables 1–3. The central point and slope of the curve are scaled to cor-
respond to the data on the evolvement of the restored and managed
habitats, derived from the survey.
Now we turn to the economic parameters, which are found in
Table 7. For cost estimates, we utilize data from Kotiaho et al. (2015).
Pine mires are usually restored once so there are only up-front costs.
The price of timber is 30 €/m3 in the calculations. A fixed cost, the total
cost of conservation, is 1000 €/ha and includes the value of the current
tree stand (20m3) at 600 €/ha and the value of land at 100 €/ha. An
administrative cost of 300 €/ha, associated with establishing a con-
servation area, is also added. A variable cost, the restoration invest-
ment, is 1400 €/ha. First, it includes the costs of removing the trees
(10m3) at 1000 €/ha and 300 €/ha revenue from selling timber.
Second, the cost of filling the drains with an excavator is 500 €/ha. A
planning cost of 200 €/ha is also added.
Herb-rich forests require a larger fixed investment in nature man-
agement in the beginning and follow-ups (a variable cost of 150 €/ha)
after the initial management investment (Kotiaho et al., 2015), we as-
sume that they are performed 20 and 40 years later. The nature man-
agement measures and their costs vary widely among sites, depending
on the state and age of the tree stand. Clearing a stand of spruce sap-
lings can be extremely costly, whereas the removal of mature spruce
can yield substantial sales revenue. We update the cost estimations
presented in Kotiaho et al. (2015) for this analysis as they used a
maximum clearing cost as a basis and we want to take into account the
wide variety of costs related to the management of herb-rich forests.
First, the fixed cost of conservation is approximately 7400 €/ha. We
calculate it as a bare land value for managed spruce forest land and add
an administrative cost of 20% (Kotiaho et al., 2015). Second, we cal-
culate the costs of nature management measures separately for a site
dominated by spruce and for one dominated by broad-leaved trees. The
age of the tree stand is also taken into account: costs are different for
saplings, young tree stands and mature tree stands. For the cost of
nature management measures F, consider Eq. (17) and Fig. 3. Para-
meters used in the calculations are presented in Table 6. Prices for saw
timber and pulpwood are from the statistics of Natural Resources In-
stitute Finland (LUKE, 2016). The vertical axis represents the growth in
forest value and the horizontal axis represents time. Spruces are re-
moved at time t’. The optimal rotation time is T*. Thus, the landowner
faces a cost for not clear cutting at time T*, but instead removing only
spruces at time t’. The term h(T∗) represents the revenue from clear
cutting at time T* and h(t′) the revenue from harvesting the spruces at
time t’. The fixed costs are discounted by a factor (1+ r)T
∗−t′. We add a
planning cost of 150 €/ha.
= + − ′ +∗ ′−
∗
F p h T r h t[ ( )(1 ) ( )] 150t T (17)
In rural biotopes, fixed costs include the cost of conservation,
4987 €/ha, which is based on the value of land (Kotiaho et al., 2015).
The fixed costs also include the cost of clearance of dense vegetation is
needed before grazing, which is estimated to be 1862 €/ha. Variable
costs, 875 €/ha per year, include the costs of annual grazing and the
clearing of vegetation, if necessary. A guidance cost of 5% is added to
the annual cost. The rural biotopes are assumed to be managed for
50 years.
3.4. Estimates for Supply and Demand
The estimates for potential supply and demand are provided in
Table 8. We define the potential supply of offsets from each selected
habitat type as the area suitable for restoration in Finland. The esti-
mates of these land areas are based on expert assessments and literature
(Kemppainen and Lehtomaa, 2009; Kotiaho et al., 2015). We estimate
the demand for offsets drawing on the predictions of future land use
change. Tiitu et al. (2015) predicted changes in the area of settlements
in Finland for the time period 2013–2040. To estimate potential de-
mand, we utilize their predictions of built-up areas (such as residential
areas, industrial and commercial complexes, areas for sports and
Table 5




Technology parameter α 3.9 3.9 3.9
Technology parameter β 2.1 2.1 2.1
Degraded state of the habitat Φ 0.62 0.565 0.77
Central point of the curve l0 30 10 20
Slope of the curve k 0.02 0.02 0.025
Point in time τ 50 50 50
Fig. 3. Costs of removing spruce at time t’ versus time T*.
Table 6
Parameters for calculating the management costs in herb-rich forests.
Broad-leaved trees dominate Spruces dominate
Interest rate 0.03 0.03
Price, saw timber (€/m3) 40 50
Price, pulpwood (€/m3) 15 17
Table 7




Variable cost (€) w 1400 150 918.75
Fixed cost (€) F 1000 9264 6849
Interest rate (real) r – 0.03 0.03
Timing of variable costs
(years)
m – 20 & 40 50
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recreation) and infrastructure (including roads, airports, extraction
sites, ports, dump sites). The report provides estimates for how many
hectares of land in each habitat type will turn into built-up areas or
infrastructure. We add the leakage of development impacts outside the
area (20%) and have also taken into account future peatland use
(1000 ha/year), based on a report by Leinonen (2010), and the objec-
tives of the Finnish National Energy and Climate Strategy (Kansallinen
energia- ja ilmastostrategia, 2013).
Direct land use changes and other activities also cause indirect
impacts, leading to decrease in habitat quality. Accounting for these
will considerably increase the size of land areas under pressure. The
magnitude of these impacts is very difficult to estimate. We include an
increase of 100 ha/year in pine mires and 50 ha/year in herb-rich for-
ests and rural biotopes. The location of the demand curve is approxi-
mated based on the estimations of land use pressure for each habitat
(Table 8), so that the market would cover the demand rising from land
use.
3.5. Uncertainty and Monte Carlo Simulations
Recall Section 3.3, in which uncertainty concerning the success of
restoration was examined. Next, we take the estimated uncertainties
into account in the model. Monte Carlo simulation allows us to examine
the possible outcomes of habitat restoration when its success may vary.
Monte Carlo simulation uses probability distributions to capture the
uncertainty of the variables under scrutiny and therefore is well suited
for the analysis of uncertainty. The simulation was performed in ac-
cordance with the results of the survey (for combining an expert survey
and Monte Carlo simulation, see Bamber and Aspinall, 2013). The re-
sults suggest the use of a triangular probability distribution in the si-
mulation. The minimum, most likely and maximum values are defined;
values around the most likely figure are more likely to occur. The
program recalculates the results, each time using a different value. The
values are selected at random from the input probability distribution
thousands of times. As a result, it produces distributions of possible
outcome values, explaining what could happen and how likely the
outcome is.
Variation in the evolvement of restored habitats over a 200-year
timespan is shown in Fig. 4. When accounting for uncertainty, the
improvement in the state of the restored habitats in rural biotopes and
herb-rich forests is still striking, since their state would significantly
degrade without restoration. The state of pine mires would improve
even without restoration. However, with restoration the improvement
is more rapid and recovery closer to the natural state more likely.
Fifty years after the restoration, 90% of the restoration outcomes are
between 0.48 and 0.65 in pine mires, 0.59 and 0.73 in herb-rich forests
and 0.48 and 0.69 in rural biotopes. The minimum values are 0.44 in
pine mires, 0.55 in herb-rich forests and 0.42 in rural biotopes. Thus,
the spread of uncertainty is widest in rural biotopes. In all the habitats
selected, interestingly, the most likely values| are closer to the upper
than the lower bounds. The lower bounds are still higher in ecological
value than the state without restoration or management measures.
Furthermore, it is useful to know how many restoration sites will
fail to provide sufficient biodiversity gains to be sold as compensation.
We assume that if the restoration outcome is< 90% of the expected
value, restoration has failed. Thus, 20% of the pine mire sites and 10%
of the herb-rich forest sites would not be saleable. Since the improve-
ment achieved with restoration is so substantial in rural biotopes, we
assume that the restoration outcome must be at least 85% of the ex-
pected value to be accepted as compensation. Thus, 10% of the rural
biotope sites would not be saleable. These figures are later taken into
account in a risk assessment.
Table 8
Total area of each habitat in Finland, areas suitable for restoration and land-use
pressure, in hectares to the year 2040.
Total area in Finland Restorable area Land-use pressure
Pine mires 193,000 193,000 33,000
Herb-rich forests 377,600 264,000 2500
Rural biotopes 100,000 30,000 3300
Table 9
Market equilibrium: no time delay, trading ratio 1.
Price, €/ha Profits, €/ha Compensation sites in total, ha
Pine mires 8150 117 31,393
Herb-rich forests 12,000 363 2000
Rural biotopes 29,559 557 3197
Table 10
Market equilibrium: 15-year time delay, trading ratio 1.6.
Price, €/ha Profits, €/ha Compensation sites in total, ha
Pine mires 8471 206 46,888
Herb-rich forests 12,500 568 3000
Rural biotopes 30,088 919 4961
Table 11
Total size of the hypothetical offset market.
Trading ratio Total size, M€ Total area, ha
1 1.6 1 1.6
Pine mires 256 397 31,393 46,888
Herb-rich forests 24 38 2000 3000
Rural biotopes 95 150 3197 4961
Total 374 584 36,590 54,849
Table 12
Trading ratios when the outcomes of restoration vary (t= 15 years, interest
rate 3%).
Loss Gain Trading ratio
No time delay Time delay 15 years
Pine mires 0.5 0.2 2.5 4
Herb-rich forests 0.5 0.35 1.5 2.3
Rural biotopes 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.3
Table 13
Market equilibrium: the outcomes of restoration vary, no time delay.
Trading ratio Price, €/ha Profits, €/ha Compensation
sites in total, ha
Pine mires 2.5 8880 320 66,667
Herb-rich forests 1.5 12,421 535 2842
Rural biotopes 0.8 29,375 432 2585
Table 14
Market equilibrium: the outcomes of restoration vary, a 15-year time delay.
Trading ratio Price, €/ha Profits, €/ha Compensation
sites in total, ha
Pine mire 4 9420 471 92,749
Herb-rich forests 2.3 13,010 776 4019
Rural biotopes 1.3 29,828 741 4093
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4. Perfectly Functioning Offset Markets, With and Without Time
Delay
Next, we apply the analytical model to examine the offset markets
numerically. We especially want to examine how the market equili-
brium – the prices and quantities traded – depends on the trading ratios.
The theoretical analysis is done assuming a perfect and well-functioning
market where mature offsets are available when needed. This type of
market may be possible when an intermediary, a broker, works in the
market. It aids the demanders and suppliers in meeting each other with
minimal transaction costs. An intermediary can also safeguard against
the risks associated with restoration by buying restored habitats be-
forehand, so that whenever degrading of a habitat occurs, the inter-
mediary is able to supply a verified restored habitat for compensation.
If the intermediary is not present in the market, possible time delays
between biodiversity losses and gains must be accounted for either by
increasing trading ratios or by landowners who must wait for the
credits to mature before selling.
In the benchmark case we set the trading ratio to unity. If there are
no mature offsets when losses occur, a time delay exists between the
losses and gains. We take this delay into account by discounting the
improvement in ecological value to the present. We use the following
equation to calculate the trading ratio to match the ecological value of









We assume that it would need t= 15 years to ensure that habitat
restoration has succeeded as expected and offsets mature and use dis-
count rate r= 3%. Using Eq. (18), a time delay of 15 years yields an
increase in the trading ratio to 1.6. We compare this to an option where
the landowner waits for the credits to mature and gets revenue only
15 years after the investment. In the next section, the analysis is com-
plicated by taking into account the varying outcomes of restoration in
different habitats.
Recall that in Eq. (3), we chose to use distance j to close the model.
Thus, the aggregate supply of offsets from each habitat is derived by
assuming that fixed costs increase when distance j increases, since re-
moter sites are more difficult to reach, and that distance defines the last
land parcel restored. For simplicity, the restoration costs are assumed to
be homogenous in other respects; only their fixed costs differ.
4.1. Benchmark for Market Equilibrium
Table 9 presents the benchmark with no time delay and the trading
ratio equal to 1. The results are presented in terms of equilibrium
prices, profits and total area of the compensation sites.
The equilibrium prices and quantities vary widely, depending on the
habitat in question. Offset credits in pine mires are the cheapest, and
the restored land areas are the largest, because they require the least
costly investment and the land use pressure is strongest. Herb-rich
forests are 50% and traditional rural biotopes four times more ex-
pensive than pine mires. Landowners' net profits are slightly over
100 €/ha for pine mires and approximately 400 and 600 €/ha for other
habitat types. The costs to companies needing offsets in these habitats
are in total approximately 370 million €.
If we add time delay, the gains must be discounted to the present.
With a 15-year delay and 3% discount rate, the trading ratio increases
from 1 to 1.6. Features of the market equilibrium are presented in
Table 10.
Relative to Table 9, both the equilibrium prices and restored land
areas increase. A higher trading ratio means that more land is needed to
compensate for the biodiversity losses: the increase is approximately
50%. The increase in prices is moderate: 2–4%. The profits for land-
owners also increase. The costs to companies needing offsets increase to
approximately 580 million €.
An alternative way to account for the time delay is that the land-
owner must wait for offsets to mature before selling. Instead of the
Table 15













Pine mires 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 5 2.5 1.7
Herb-rich forests 0.5 0.2 0.35 0.6 2.5 1.5 0.8
Rural biotopes 0.5 0.45 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.6
Table 16





Compensation sites in total,
ha
Pine mires 5 9706 552 106,589
Herb-rich forests 2.5 13,143 831 4286
Rural biotopes 1.1 27,858 751 3860
Table 17
Market equilibrium with an intermediary fee, trading ratio 1.
Intermediary's fee, €/ha Buyer price, €/ha Profits, €/ha Compensation sites in total, ha
Pine mires 407 8509 104 29,067
Herb-rich forests 600 12,533 336 1867
Rural biotopes 1478 30,960 505 2941
Table 18









Pine mires 1630 9587 64 22,089
Herb-rich forests 1200 13,067 308 1733
Rural biotopes 5912 35,163 348 2170
Table 19










Pine mires 2852 10,665 24 15,112
Herb-rich forests 3000 14,667 226 1333
Rural biotopes 8868 37,965 243 1656
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developer buying credits before they are mature and compensating for
that by buying more (Table 10), the landowner bears the cost of waiting
for the credits to mature and does not get revenue until 15 years after
the investment. How will this affect the market equilibrium in tradi-
tional rural biotopes, where the costs are the highest? The new equili-
brium price is 45,009 €, which is 50% higher compared to the bench-
mark case of Table 9, while from Table 10 we saw that increasing the
trading ratio increases the price only 2%. Furthermore, the land area
traded in the market (9365 ha) is 90% less than the benchmark case,
whereas with higher trading ratio, the land area increases 55%. The
implications of an advanced credit release policy can be found on Ap-
pendix A.
Table 11 shows the total estimated size of the offset market for each
selected habitat and land areas traded to the year 2040. However, it
must be noted that this we did not estimate the entire hypothetical
offset market in Finland – only the three selected habitat types.
When the trading ratio is equal to 1 and there is no time delay, the
market size is estimated to be almost 370 million € in total.
Approximately 37,000 ha of land would be restored and conserved. If
the trading ratio increased to 1.6, the total size of the market would be
580 million € and approximately 55,000 ha.
4.2. Market Equilibrium When the Outcomes of Restoration Vary
The results of the expert survey showed that the outcomes of re-
storation differ between habitats. Now, we take the results into account.
To calculate a representative trading ratio, we employ the average
ecological value produced with restoration. We set the amount of loss
arbitrarily equal to 0.5. Table 12 shows the losses and gains as well as
trading ratios in result, both with and without time delay.
Table 12 illustrates clearly that a perfect and well-functioning
market with a sufficient stock of mature restored habitats leads to lower
trading ratios and expectedly lower market prices. In all, the trading
ratios required are the highest in pine mires, because the increase in
ecological value achieved with restoration is the lowest in mires. Next,
the properties of market equilibrium are examined more closely.
Picking up the trading ratios from Table 12 leads to the following
market equilibrium in Table 13.
Relative to Table 9, offset prices from pine mires and herb-rich
forests increase due to increased trading ratios. In terms of land area,
the increase is most dramatic in pine mires, because restoration in-
creases their ecological value only slightly and gradually, so that much
larger areas are needed relative to other habitats. Since the trading
ratios are the highest in pine mires, their restored land is now almost 2
times higher in comparison to the benchmark case. In herb-rich forests,
the total area of compensation sites increases more moderately (40%).
Landowners' profits behave accordingly: those of pine mires and herb-
rich forests increase, while the profits from rural biotopes decrease as
their trading ratios fall below unity. The state of rural biotopes im-
proves such a degree (recall Fig. 2) that, unlike in other habitats, it is
more likely that the gains are higher than the losses. The restored land
area decreases by approximately 20% in comparison with Table 9 but
the impact to the price is very small (0.6%).
Next, we add a time delay to the previous analysis and employ the
trading ratios reported in Table 12. The new market equilibrium is
presented in Table 14.
Again, as the trading ratios increase, the prices, the profits and the
total area of compensation sites increase. Now, the trading ratio in rural
biotopes also rises above unity. Due to the high trading ratio (4) in pine
mires, the area of the compensation sites now covers almost half of the
potential restorable area. The same figure is 2% in herb-rich forests and
14% in rural biotopes.
Fig. 4. Variation in the evolvement of restored habitats.
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4.3. Sensitivity Analysis
In the previous section, where we took into account the different
outcomes of restoration, the improvement in ecological value was
measured at a point in time τ=50. We next examine how changing the
point in time when the improvements are accounted for affects the
trading ratios.
Table 15 shows that the later the gains are calculated, the higher
they become, because with the passage of time, the difference between
a restored habitat and a habitat in a business-as-usual scenario in-
creases. Thus, the trading ratios are higher if the gains are calculated at
an earlier point in time. When the trading ratios are higher, the equi-
librium prices and profits for landowners as well as the restored land
areas increase. Table 16 shows how changing τ to 25 affects the market
equilibrium.
We see that relative to Table 13, the trading ratios increase, and the
increase is especially high in pine mires. The equilibrium price in-
creases by 10% and the area of compensation sites by 60%. In herb-rich
forests, the equilibrium price increases by 6% and the increase in the
area of compensation sites is 50%. In rural biotopes, the price increases
by 1%, but the increase in the area of compensation sites is 35%. Thus,
the determination of τ has a significant impact and must be considered
when the results of this study are interpreted.
5. Transaction Costs and the Risk of Failure
It has been suggested that an intermediary would be an institution
that would help to alleviate transaction costs for market participants
(Coggan et al., 2013a; OECD, 2016). In the previous case of perfect
markets, these services were assumed to be cost free, but naturally this
is not plausible. In this chapter, we consider how a brokerage fee col-
lected by the intermediary affects the market equilibrium. First, the
intermediary collects a payment as a fee for the services it provides to
reduce market participants' transaction costs. This is added to the offset
price. Second, the intermediary estimates the proportion of failed pro-
jects and includes a risk premium in the brokerage services, which
again shows up in offset prices.
Fig. 5 qualitatively illustrates the impacts of the additional fees.
Pricing the transaction costs and risks affects the market as if it were a
tax: if levied on buyers the (after-premium) demand curve shifts
downwards, and if levied on suppliers the (after-premium) supply curve
shifts upwards. In both cases, the price increases to p** and the fee
collected by the intermediary is an amount represented by area p∗∗ABps.
Due to higher prices, the area of compensation sites in total will de-
crease from Q* to Q**.
5.1. Transaction Costs
In offset markets, transaction costs can incur when the developer
must learn about offset requirements, negotiate requirements with the
regulator, find suppliers and negotiate contracts with the suppliers.
Transaction costs to the supplier can include the costs of learning about
offsets and what can be supplied, negotiating contracts with buyers and
the regulator, monitoring and reporting compensation measures and
responding to enforcement measures in case the compensation sites do
not meet their requirements (Coggan et al., 2013a). An intermediary
can reduce these costs by providing information, brokerage services etc.
Now, we assume that the intermediary includes an additional pay-
ment in the price as a fee for the services it provides to reduce market
participants' transaction costs. The fee is 5% of the offset price (from
Table 9) (a similar brokerage fee in Hessen, Germany is 6% (OECD,
2016)). The new market equilibrium with the added fee is presented in
Table 17.
From the table, we see that the intermediary fee has only a small
impact to the market equilibria. Relative to Table 9, the buyer prices
increase by 5%. The decrease in the total area of compensation sites is
7–8%. If we compare these figures to those in Table 10, we can see that
it is cheaper for the developers to purchase mature offsets from the
intermediary and pay the fee, instead of buying immature offsets with a
higher trading ratio in pine mires and herb-rich forests. In rural bio-
topes, where the offset price is higher, a 5% fee causes a 3% higher
increase in the price than increasing the trading ratio.
5.2. Risk Premium
Not all restoration projects are likely to succeed. This creates a risk
in the market and the environment: buyers buy compensations that do
not improve the state of habitats. The intermediary can play a con-
structive role in reducing the risk of failures in the market. In the
previous case of perfect markets, it was implicitly assumed that the
intermediary safeguards against failed compensations. The inter-
mediary can price the economic and ecological risks in the brokerage
services by estimating the monetary value of the failed projects.
The Monte Carlo simulation results provide data on the percentage
of restored sites that will not recover as expected. When restoration is
not successful, the sites are not saleable. The intermediary calculates
the revenue loss from the failures and allocates a risk premium in the
market. We assume that if the outcome of restoration is< 90% of the
expected value, restoration has failed and there is no compensation to
be sold. For instance, in pine mires, this means that 20% of the restored
area, 6279 ha, is useless and the loss is worth approximately 50 million
€. The loss per hectare is 1630 €, which is the risk premium collected by
the intermediary. In herb-rich forests, 10% of the sites are not saleable.
Since the improvement achieved with restoration is so substantial in
rural biotopes, we assume that sites that achieve at least 85% of the
expected value would be saleable as compensation. Thus, 20% of the
sites are not saleable. The new market equilibrium with risk premiums
(and trading ratio equal to 1) is presented in Table 18.
Comparing Table 18 with Table 9 reveals that in all habitats, the
prices are now 10–20% higher. In pine mires and rural biotopes, the
restored land areas are approximately 30% lower. In herb-rich forests,
the compensated land area is 13% smaller. Thus, the impact of the
elimination of ecological risks is not especially large in the market but
by eliminating failures in restoration its impact on biodiversity may be
considerable. Economic risk is greatest in rural biotopes (approximately
20M€), and the risk in terms of land area is greatest in pine mires
(6300 ha).
Finally, we consider how increasing the risk premium affects the
market equilibrium. Above, we assumed that if the restoration outcome
is< 90% of the expected value, or 85% in rural biotopes, restoration
has failed and there is no compensation to be sold. Results showing how
increasing this requirement by 5% will affect risk premiums and theFig. 5. Effect of additional fees on the market.
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market equilibrium are provided in Table 19.
In comparison with Table 18, we see that the impact is substantial:
the risk premiums increase by 75% in pine mires and 50% rural bio-
topes and are 2.5 times higher in herb-rich forests. Consequently, the
buyer prices increase and the profits decrease further. In pine mires, the
profits start to approach zero. If the risk premiums are high, in habitats
where there is a lot of uncertainty regarding the success of restoration,
offset credits will be expensive and landowners will get negative profits.
Thus, it may not be feasible to raise the level of the premiums ex-
cessively high.
6. Discussion
Internationally, restoring ecosystems has become an important way
to slow down the loss of biodiversity and maintain ecosystem services
(Wende et al., 2018). In this article, we developed an equilibrium model
to examine biodiversity offset markets and applied the analytical model
to three selected habitats. We analysed how trading ratios, the presence
of an intermediary and the realization of risks associated with un-
certainty affect the market equilibrium: the offset prices and land areas
traded as compensation.
The results show that the size of the offset markets could potentially
be considerable, which is a prerequisite for a functioning biodiversity
offset market (Wissel and Wätzold, 2010). Providing offsets could be a
profitable business for landowners as there is potential demand and
there would be enough land and suitable habitats for compensations in
Finland, even when the trading ratios are relatively high. In habitats
where restoration or nature management is laborious and expensive,
the offset prices are high and, especially when continuous management
is required, compensation can be very costly. The relative amount of
biodiversity losses and restored gains as well as possible time delays
impact the trading ratios and, thus, have a major impact on the market
equilibrium in our analysis, which corresponds to the results found by
Doyle and Yates (2010).
An intermediary that provides brokerage, offset aggregator and
banker services may decrease the costs of compensation for developers,
provided that it can provide mature offsets when needed. The results
show that as long as the brokerage fees and risk premiums collected by
the intermediary are not excessively high, the impact of pricing these
services in the market is quite modest, apart from rural biotopes where
the market size may decrease considerably. Drechsler and Hartig
(2011) find that long restoration time lags may limit offset credit supply
and shrink the size of the market, which also calls for the presence of an
intermediary in the market.
The trading ratios applied in our analysis were relatively low in
comparison with those found in the literature (Gibbons et al., 2015;
Laitila et al., 2014; Moilanen et al., 2009), because expected values
were used in the calculation of the trading ratio. We did not consider
uncertainty or the possibility that restoration could fail completely –
this scenario was included in the risk premium, since the intermediary
bears the risk of failure. Secondly, there are also other sources of un-
certainty that would increase the trading ratio. They can be taken into
account by adding an error weight (Moilanen et al., 2009). Small error
weights can be used if there is abundant experience and knowledge
regarding the restoration and management of the habitats studied and
the site is well surveyed. A higher error is needed if an area is poorly
surveyed or there is a lack of knowledge, e.g. if a new restoration
technique is tested. The trading ratio increases substantially if it is as-
sumed that success between distinct restoration sites is correlated to
some degree. However, the feasibility of very high trading ratios (in-
creasing from dozens to hundreds) is debatable. The trading ratios
employed here were consistent with those used in practice (Bull et al.,
2016b), except for the fact that the ratios proposed are rarely below 1.0.
There are some limitations in the model and its application. A major
challenge was that this type of offset markets had not yet been estab-
lished in Finland, and the data available on the existing offset markets,
realized costs and prices were very limited. To estimate the supply and
demand, we had to rely on expert assessments, and apply and combine
information from many documented sources. Many assumptions had to
be made to include the crucial factors in the study without any support
from similar analyses or experiences from existing offset markets.
Determining τ, the point in time when improvement in the ecolo-
gical state of the habitat is calculated, significantly impacted the
trading ratios and, thus, the equilibrium prices and compensation sites
traded. This must be noted when the results are interpreted. In the
sensitivity analysis, we compared several alternatives (25, 50 and
100 years), and the differences in the equilibrium prices and land areas
traded were substantial. However, there is no unambiguous answer to
what the level of τ should be. Expert assessments may be the best way
to ensure that τ is set to a point in time that is low enough to be feasible,
but high enough to ensure that the calculation of ecological gains is
reliable. The same applies to the level of intermediary fees and risk
premiums. Since there is little data available on the level of these kinds
of payments from existing offset markets, we used a similar brokerage
fee as in Hessen, Germany. However, the level of the payments is de-
termined in the market. Thus, the results concerning the impact of risk
premiums and intermediary fees should only be used to analyse their
impact on the market in general.
In our analysis, we assumed that offsetting is mandatory – all ad-
verse impacts on biodiversity from land-use change must be compen-
sated. If offsetting were voluntary, it would strongly affect the demand,
and the market size would shrink. We have assumed trading in-kind,
but if trading up was possible, purchasing credits from rural biotopes
and herb-rich forests could increase, because they are more valuable to
biodiversity than mires and thus, provide higher ecological gains.
However, high offset prices would likely limit trading up. Trading down
is not preferred, but if it was allowed, there would be risk that demand
would channel predominantly to pine mires, since they are up to eight
times cheaper than other habitats examined in this analysis.
This study aimed to provide a new type of analysis of biodiversity
offset markets on the market level. The analytical model introduced
here could be used to further study the various factors in the market:
taking a closer look at trading ratios or adding carbon offsets in the
market, for instance. The model could be further developed and tested
with a case study if data on the realized offset trades were to become
available. Since the information available on intermediaries in offset
markets is limited to a few case studies, closer analysis is needed, e.g. of
the various roles of the intermediary and how the intermediaries impact
transaction costs and prices and ease trades in the market.
Implementing an offsetting mechanism could improve the current
state of biodiversity and habitat restoration in Finland. There is a lot of
experience and knowledge regarding the restoration and management
of mire and forest habitats in Finland (Aapala et al., 2013; Similä and
Junninen, 2011), as well as degraded habitats suitable for restoration,
which is an advantage. The results show that there may be potential for
both supply of and demand for biodiversity offsets in Finland. Still,
offsetting alone will not be sufficient. Preserving the most valuable
species and habitats is essential, and all impacts cannot be compen-
sated. Irreplaceable, extremely vulnerable ecosystems and habitats or
endangered species are always no-go areas where offsetting cannot be
applied. Biodiversity offsetting can potentially be an important addition
to the policy mix to halt the alarming rate of biodiversity loss and en-
sure the well-functioning future ecosystem services.
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